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PREFACE

•

More than eleven years have passed since California voters
approved Proposition 13 in June 1978.

That once-calamitous

change in the way California's local governments are financed
is now fully implemented and, for many, is the only property
tax system they have ever known.
Proposition 13 has given rise to several significant court
decisions over the last decade, some of which remolded the
shape of the initiative in important areas.

However, since the

California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
initiative in the landmark Amador

Vall~

decision in 1979, no

lawsuits have attempted a fundamental challenge to
Proposition 13.
Current Court Challenges to Proposition 13

I
In 1989, however, two groups of lawsuits have emerged
which, if successful, could shake the foundation of Proposition
13.

One set of three cases seeks to overturn the assessment

provisions of Proposition 13.

These provisions limit the

growth in assessed value of properties while they are
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held by the current owner, allowing market value reappraisals
only at time of ownership change or new construction.

This

results in large variations in tax liability of similar
properties.

Three different plaintiffs are challenging this

feature of Proposition 13 as a violation of equal protection
guarantees.

The lawsuits were prompted by a U.S. Supreme Court

decision in a West Virginia property tax case handed down
earlier this year.

I

A second set of three cases challenges Proposition 13's
statutory allocation of property tax proceeds among local
government agencies.

Known as AB 8, this statute distributes

the proceeds of the local property tax among cities, counties
and districts by a complex formula.

Several local government

agencies are challenging this formula system, arguing that it
unfairly and improperly shifts tax revenues away from some
local governments to the benefit of others.
Five of the lawsuits currently are at the Superior Court
level, and one is on appeal.

If any of them were to be

ultimately successful, they would seriously disrupt the
I

financing of local government in California· and would produce
much uncertainty and confusion while the Legislature sought
viable schemes to replace them.

ii

PREFACE

Purpose of This Briefing Book
This briefing book is designed to provide background
materials for Legislators and interested parties as part of an
interim hearing of the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee
entitled "Current Court Challenges to the Constitutionality of
Proposition 13 and Its Implementing Laws."

•

The purpose of the

hearing is to inform members and the public of the existence
and status of these lawsuits, and to introduce them to the
arguments made by those who seek to overturn aspects of current
law and those who seek to defend current law.
Chapter 1 provides background on the property assessment
provisions of Proposition 13, and summarizes the three lawsuits
which challenge the validity of the assessment features of
Proposition 13.

Chapter 2 covers the history of the property

tax allocation statutes and summarizes the three lawsuits in
this area.

The pink pages following this Preface present

questions and issues which may be helpful to discuss at the
public hearing.

iii
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QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

Challenges to Proposition 13's Assessment Method
1) What remedies are the plaintiffs asking the court to order
in these cases?
2) What is the range of possible rulings the courts could hand
down?
3) If any of these lawsuits are successful, what will replace
Proposition 13's assessment system?
4) How would approval of Voter Revolt's split roll initiative
affect these lawsuits?
5) What is the outlook for consolidating the three cases?
6) When do parties to these lawsuits predict these cases will
go to trial and receive rulings?

•

the

u.s.

When could decisions by

Supreme Court be expected?
Challenges to AB 8's Allocation Method

•

l) Have decisions been handed down in other lawsuits which
might indicate how the courts will regard these attempts to
invalidate AB 8?
2) What is the range of possible rulings the courts could hand
down?

,

-~-

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES

3) If one of these cases should be successful, what are the
statewide implications?
4) How are the plaintiffs' arguments affected by provisions
enacted by the Legislature in 1987 and 1988 which provide
property tax allocations to no- and low-property-tax cities?
5) What is the present status of these cases, and why have they
been slow to reach trial?
6) What is the outlook for consolidating the three cases?
7) When do parties to these lawsuits predict these cases will
go to trial and receive rulings?

Will there be appeals?

When could final decisions be expected?
8) What remedies are the plaintiffs requesting?

Are plaintiffs

asking for changes only in the allocation of future property
tax revenues 1 or are they also asking for retroactive
changes to prior years• allocations?
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CHAPTER 1
CHALLENGES TO PROPOSITION 13'S ASSESSMENT PROVISIONS
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CHAPTER 1
ASSESSMENT
Introduction
As a prelude to this discussion of current court challenges
to Proposition 13, it may be helpful to touch briefly on the
fundamentals of property taxation in California.
The property tax is the major general revenue source for
local agencies in California.

It is imposed on the owners of

property in proportion to the assessed value of the property
and applies to all classes of property.
For purposes of taxation, property is divided into two
categories:

real property and personal property.

Real

property is land, permanently attached improvements, fixtures,
and mineral rights.

Personal property consists of movable

property such as equipment, vessels, aircraft, and the like.
Real and personal property can be either locally-assessed or
state-assessed.
Article XIIIA, added to the California Constitution in 1978
by Proposition 13, revolutionized property taxation in
California by changing both the tax rate and method of
assessment.

However 1 Chapter 1 exclusively examines current

court challenges to Proposition 13's assessment provision and
covers only locally-assessed real property.
Background:

Assessment Before Proposition 13

Prior to Proposition 13, assessments for both real and
personal property were based on the "fair market value'' or
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"full cash value" of property, i.e., the price knowledgeable
and willing buyers and sellers would agree upon for such a
property, given its highest and best use.
Although the assessor of each county had the constitutional
mandate to annually assess all property subject to taxation by
the March 1 lien date, fiscal and staffing constraints
prohibited the assessor from physically reappraising all

I

properties each year.

Consequently, reappraisals would be

conducted in certain geographic areas on a periodic, cyclical
basis of every three to seven years.

Between physical

reappraisals, assessors would often apply interim value
increases based on trending factors.
Except for preferentially-assessed property,

(e.g., open

space, agricultural land, and qualifying timberland), there was
no limitation on the amount of value added to the roll when a
property was reassessed to market value.
In summary, under the pre-Proposition 13 system, properties
of similar market value generally received similar assessments.

•

Progosition 13's Assessment System
Proposition 13 drastically altered the way real property
was assessed in California.

It changed California's method of

assessment from one based on a property's current market value
to one based on so-called "acquisition value."
For purposes of transition from one system to another,
Proposition 13 rolled back property values to their 1975-76
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fair market value.

Properties which have not sold or undergone

new construction since 1975-76 are said to have a 1975-76 base
year value.
Proposition 13 requires county assessors to adjust a
property's base year value upward each year to reflect
inflationary increases, but it caps this annual reassessment at
2%.

Consequently, the only two instances in which a property

can be reassessed upwards by more than 2% per year is upon a
change in ownership or new construction.
When a property is sold or transferred, or any other kind
of change in ownership occurs, the property is reassessed to
current fair market or
the transfer.

''acquisition~

value as of the date of

Newly constructed property (which can be

property built from the ground up or an addition to existing
property) is also assessed at current fair market value as of
the date of completion.

Once a property is reassessed upward

upon completion or change in ownership, it is said to have an
"adjusted base year value."

A property can have multiple base

year values due to new construction until the whole property
changes ownership, when it will be assigned a new base year
value based on its total fair market value at the time of sale.
(Some forms of new construction or changes in ownership are
exempt from reassessment.

These include intrafamily transfers,

replacement of senior citizens' residences, replacement of
damaged or destroyed property, and property taken by eminent
domain.)
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ASSESSMENT
It should be noted also that Proposition 13's assessment
provisions affected only locally-assessed real property;
state-assessed utilities and locally-assessed personal property
are subject to the valuation rules which were in effect prior
to Proposition 13.

Moreover, all pre-Proposition 13 property

tax exemptions (e.g., for open space, agricultural land, etc.)
remain in effect.
Consequently, under Proposition 13, properties with similar
fair market values can have widely disparate tax bills.

It is

quite common for two neighbors living in identical homes to
have entirely different tax assessments.

Table 1 at the end of

this chapter illustrates how a home is assessed under
Proposition 13.
Previous Relevant Court Cases
&T.ador Valley (1979).

Opponents of Proposition 13

wasted little time in challenging the constitutionality of
the initiative.

In Amador Valley Joint Union High School

District v. State Board of Equalization, attorneys for the
plaintiff argued that Proposition 13:
a)

Was a revision of, and not an amendment to, the
Constitution and therefore could not be adopted through
the initiative process;

b)

Violated the single-subject and summary of purpose
requirements of the Constitution;

c)

Violated the federal equal protection clause;
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d)

Impaired the constitutional right to travel;

e)

Would result· in impairment of contracts; and

f)

Was void for vagueness.
By a six to one vote, the California Supreme Court

dismissed all challenges, including the crucial equal
protection test.

Writing for the majority, Justice J.

Richardson opined:
We cannot say that the acquisition value
approach incorporated in article XIII A, by
which a property owner's tax liability bears a
reasonable relation to his costs of acquisition,
is wholly arbitrary or irrational.

Accordingly,

the measure under scrutiny herein meets the
demands of equal protection principles.
Dissenting from this position, Chief Justice Rose Bird
argued that:
The basic problem with this position is that it
upholds the adoption of an assessment scheme
that systematically assigns different values to
property of equal worth.
Because this California Supreme Court decision was not
appealed, it remains the highest judicial ruling on the
constitutionality of Proposition 13.
Allegheny (1989).

In January of this year the United

States Supreme Court rekindled the debate over the
constitutionality of Proposition 13 by ruling in a West
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Virginia property tax case, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Company v. County Commission of Webster County, that the
county's method of taxation violated the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution.
On its face, Webster County's method of taxation appears
very similar to that of Proposition 13.

•

The Webster County

tax assessor valued real property on the basis of its
recent purchase price but made only minor, periodic
adjustments in the assessments of land that had not been
recently sold.
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company and several other
coal companies brought suit against Webster County,
claiming that the assessed values of their properties were
as much as 35 times higher than the assessed values of
comparable neighboring properties.
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded unanimously that this
practice denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the law
because it "resulted in gross disparities in the assessed
value of generally comparable property." Recognizing that
its opinion could be construed to directly affect
California's Proposition 13, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, noted in a footnote:
We need not and do not decide today whether the
Webster County assessment method would stand on
a different footing if it were the law of a
State, generally applied, instead of the
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aberrational enforcement policy it appears to
be.
Chief Justice Rehnquist subsequently made a direc
reference to Proposition 13, leaving little doubt that the
Court's opinion purposefully avoided addressing the
question of the constitutionality of the California
initiative.

Rather, the Court's decision seemed to set the

stage for a later resolution of that issue.
Nevertheless, the similarities between California's and
Webster County's method of assessment have led some to
conclude thaL if brougl1t before the

u.s.

Supreme Court,

Proposition 13 would be invalidated.
Assessment Cases Filed In California This Year
Seizing the Court's apparent invitation in Allegheny 1
taxpayers have so far filed three cases in California this
challenging Proposition 13's assessment provisions.
Though the facts in each case vary, all of them challenge
Proposition 13's provision which requires increased assessment
of property when a change in ownership occurs.

All claim that

Proposition 13 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Below is a brief description of each of the three cases.
1)

Northwest Financial v. State Board of Equalization and
San Diego County
Northwest Financial, a Nevada firm, pure
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horne in La Jolla, California on Novenilier 30, 1987 for
$730,000.

Shortly thereafter, the property was

reassessed up to its purchase price, representing
market value.
The company filed suit on April 12, 1989, claiming
that Proposition 13 is "invidiously discriminatory"
and violates the equal protection clause of the U.S .

•

Constitution.

The suit argues that the property's

current tax base of $730,000 is approximately four
times higher than its base under the previous owner.
The property's previous base was $175,839.

The

plaintiff is asking for a refund of property taxes.
Although the case was dismissed by the San Diego
County Superior Court on September 14, plaintiffs plan
to file an appeal.
2)

Nordlinger v. Lynch
Stephanie Nordlinger, a Los Angeles County
resident, filed suit against John J. Lynch, Los
Angeles County tax assessor on September 28, 1989 .

•

Like Northwest Financial, Nordlinger is challenging
the increased market value assessment of her property
which took place when the change in ownership
occurred.
The suit details the property tax disparity between
Nordlinger's property and similarly situated
properties within the same tract of homes.

-11-
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areas of California, the suit claims, there is as much
as a 15 to 1 disparity in property assessments of
properties with similar fair market values.
Nordlinger is asking the Los Angeles County
Superior Court to declare Proposition l3's assessment
provisions and the tax assessment of her property
invalid.
Arguments in the case have not been heard.
3)

R. H. Macy & Co., Inc,, et. al. v. Contra Costa

Co~nty

R. H. Macy & Co., a Delaware Corporation, is a
large retailer which owns a store in the Sun

ley

Mall in Concord, a city in Contra Costa County.
R. H. Macy's predecessor underwent a corporate
restructuring in 1986, it constituted a change
ownership under Proposition 13.

Consequently, the

county assessor reassessed its department store to
fair market value.
R. H. Macy claims that this reassessment increased
its property tax bill by more than 250%.
the suit alleges that Macy·s paid approximate

2.5

times more in property taxes than either J. C.
Penney's or Sears which own comparable property in the
same mall.
Unique in this suit is the use of a detailed,
computerized statistical study which shows both the
magnitude and distribution of disparity ratios caused

-12-
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by changes in ownership in Contra Costa County after
1975.
One study was of properties that were on both the
1975 and 1987 rolls.

According to the plaintiff's

Complaint, this study revealed that 75% of commercial
properties and 57% of residential properties retained
their 1975 base year value on the 1987 assessment
roll.

As can be expected, the plaintiff and defendant

differ on the interpretation of these statistics.
Plaintiff is asking the Contra Costa County
Superior Court to do the following:
a.

Declare Proposition· 13 unconstitutional on its
face and as applied;

b.

Declare increased change in ownership
assessments imposed on Macy's or any of its
subsidiaries void;

c.

Order that such assessments and taxes must be
based on the 1975 base year value; and

d.

•

Refund all taxes paid .

Arguments in the case have not been heard.
Arguments To Overturn The Assessment System
The following is a simplified summary of the arguments made
by plaintiffs in the three cases to support their claims that
Proposition 13's assessment provisions are invalid:
l)

Proposition 13's assessment system routinely discriminates

-13-
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against recent property owners in favor of long-time
property owners, thus violating the equal protection clause
of the California and U.S. Constitutions.
2)

Proposition 13's assessment system is indistinguishable

a

from the Webster County, West Virginia system which was
recently invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
3)

Similar properties situated side by side have as much as a
15 to 1 disparity in assessed value under Proposition 13.
Assuming the same rate of growth in assessed value over the
next 10 years, by 1999 the disparity in assessed value for
similarly situated properties may be as much as 100 to 1.

4)

Recent property owners bear a disproportionately greater
property tax burden than do long-time owners who are
similarly situated.

This is in violation of the equal

protection clause of the California and

u.s.

Constitutions.

Arguments To Sustain The Assessment System
The following is a simplified summary of the arguments made
by defendants in the three cases to support their claims that
Proposition 13's assessment provisions are valid:
1)

The equal protection clause of the California and U.S.
Constitution protects people, not property.

Proposition 13

treats people fairly because people who pay the same amount
for similar property at the same time have similar tax
bills.

-14-
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2)

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny does not
affect Proposition 13 because West Virginia's Constitution,
unlike California's, requires property to be taxed in
proportion to its current market value.

Proposition 13

taxes property in proportion to its acquisition value.
3)

The Allegheny decision does not apply because Webster
County, unlike California, did not provide a rational,
policy basis for its taxation scheme.

Proposition 13 is

the result of a deliberate and articulated policy choice.
4)

Disparities in the tax assessment of similarly situated
properties were envisioned by both the framers and those
who voted for Proposition 13.

This disparity, in and of

itself, does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution if it has a rational basis.
5)

The California Supreme Court has specifically upheld
Proposition 13 against an equal protection challenge.

6)

The plaintiffs bear a smaller tax burden than those who
purchased property after them.

With the passage of time,

plaintiff's share of the tax burden will grow
disproportionately smaller than the most recent property
owners; therefore the system equalizes over time.

-15-
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Table 1
HOW A HOME IS ASSESSED UNDER PROPOSITION 13
Calculations
o If a horne (which has not changed
ownership or had new
construction) has an assessed
value of $50,000 in 1978 and is
located in a county where the tax
rate is 1.05%, its property tax
bill will be $525.
0

If in the following year (1979)
the inflation factor is 2%, the
horne's assessed value will be
Its new tax bill will
$51,000.
be $535.50.

o Assuming a new wing with a market
value of $10,000 is added to the
horne in 1980 and the inflation
factor is 2%, the tax liability
will be $651.21.
This figure is computed by first
finding the property's new
adjusted base year value of
$52,020 and then computing the
tax bill as if the new
construction had not occurred,
which is $546.21. Property tax
on the new wing is computed
separately and added to the tax
on the old structure. The new
wing's tax is $105; therefore,
the total property tax bill is
$651.21.
o If the property is sold on July
1, 1983 for $175,000--which
becomes its new base year
value--the tax will be $1,837.50.
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.0105

assess. value
tax rate

$ 525.00

tax liability

$ 50,000
1.0200
$ 51,000
X
.0105

assess. value
2% inflation
new value
tax rate

$ 535.50

tax liability

$ 51,000

assess. value
2% inflation
new value
tax rate
pre-wing tax

$ 50 1 000

x

X

1.0200
$ 52,020
X
.Q105
$ 546.21
X

$ 10,000
X

.Q105

$ 105.00

value of wing
tax rate
tax on wing

s

546.21

+

lOS.OQ

pre-wing tax
tax on wing

s

651.21

tax liability

$175,000
x
.Ql05

new value
tax rate

$1837.50

tax liability

•
CHAPTER 2
ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY TAX REVENUE TO LOCAL AGENCIES

I
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Introduction
Chapter 2 discusses pending lawsuits which challenge not
Proposition 13 itself, but rather one of the most important
statutes implementing Proposition 13.

This group of lawsuits

seeks to overturn AB 8, the major statute which determines'how
property tax proceeds under Proposition 13 are distributed
among counties, cities, special districts, and school
districts.
This litigation addresses allocation of property tax
revenue arising from the countywide one percent property tax
rate.

Revenues raised from add-on tax rates levied to pay for

voter-approved indebtedness are not at issue in these cases.
Background: Allocation of Property Tax Revenues Before
Proposition 13
Until the 1978-79 fiscal year--that is, before Proposition
13 took effect--cities, counties, special districts and school

•

districts in California all were authorized to levy their own
tax rates.

The governing board of each local agency would

adopt a tax rate by ordinance annually.
These rates were expressed as so many cents per $100 of
assessed value of property.

Tax rates in a hypothetical

community in the late 1970's might have been $0.75 levied by
the county, $0.80 levied by the city, $1.10 levied by the
school district, and $0.50 levied by special districts serving
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the area.

Therefore, the total tax rate applying to properties

within the boundaries of these four agencies would have been
the sum of their rates, $3.15 per $100 of assessed valuation
(here expressed in terms of the current 100% assessment ratio
rather than the previous 25% assessment ratio.)
Prior to Proposition 13, the county tax collector sent a
tax bill to each property in the county, billing the property
owner for the tax arising from the sum total of all the
property tax rates levied by the local agencies serving the
property.

These tax proceeds were then divided and returned by

the county auditor to each of the local agencies in the county,
in proportion to the tax rates each agency levied.
Therefore, before Proposition J3 each local agency had the
authority to determine how much property tax revenue it would
collect each year.

It exercised this authority by applying a

tax rate to the assessed value of properties within its
boundaries.

The tax rate each property owner paid was the sum

total of all the rates levied by the several local agencies
serving his property.

The revenue arising from each agency's

tax rate was tracked and allocated directly to that agency for
expenditure.
What Proposition 13 Provided
One of the key provisions of Proposition 13 was the
placement of a cap on the total property tax rate that could
apply to property in California.

-19-
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13 the combined tax rate paid to all local agencies by
California property owners averaged about three percent of
assessed value, Proposition 13 limited the countywide tax rate
to one percent of assessed value.
For practical purposes, Proposition 13 also did away with
the authority of local agencies to set and levy their own tax
rates.

Rather, the initiative established a single countywide

tax rate of one percent and required the Legislature to put in
place a mechanism for allocating the proceeds of this
countywide rate to the various agencies within each county.
This is the language adopted by the voters in Section 1(a)
of Article XIIIA of the Constitution:
The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real
property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of
the full cash value of such property.

The one

percent (1%) to be collected by the counties and
apportioned according to law to the districts
within the counties.

I

How Proposition 13 Was Implemented By AB 8 of 1979
In the aftermath of Proposition 13, the Legislature first
enacted a one-year, short-term implementation program referred
to as SB 154, which applied to the 1978-79 fiscal year.

The

following year it enacted AB 8, which was a comprehensive,
long-term implementation of the initiative.

Both these pieces

of legislation were complex and covered many aspects of
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Proposition 13's implementation.

The paragraphs below describe

in simplified terms the provisions of AB 8 which address
allocation of the proceeds of the countywide one percent
property tax rate.
The Policy Underlying AB 8.

The dilemma the Legislature

faced was to divide up the proceeds of a much smaller property
tax "pie" to all local agencies in each county.

The goal was

to do this in a way which shared the reduction among them
equitably and would, over the long-term, respond flexibly and
fairly to growth and development within each county.
The path the Legislature chose in implementing Proposition
13 was to make a one-time distribution of property tax revenues
in 1979-80, which became a "base" for all future years, and
then to provide a procedure for allocating future increases in
property tax revenues arising from growth and development
(called "increment").
How AB 8 Works.

Under AB 8, the amount each local agency

receives in property tax revenues each year is a combination of
the calculation of its "base" revenues and its "increment."
This is how the two components of the allocation system
work:
Base.

The 1979-80 "base" amount of property tax revenue

which each agency receives was originally determined in two
steps.
First, property tax revenues from Proposition 13's first
year (1978-79) under SB 154 were divided among local

-21-

CHAPTER 2
ALLOCATION
agencies.

Because Proposition 13 reduced the countywide

tax rate from an average of just under three percent to one
percent and reduced property assessments, property tax
revenues were about $5 billion less statewide than they had
been in the prior year.

This smaller "pie" was allocated

to local agencies in proportion to the average share of
county property tax revenues each received in the three
years preceding Proposition 13.
Second, additional amounts of property taxes were added
to the allocations for each city, county and special
district based on block grants made to those

age~cies

in

the first-year (1978-79) emergency implementation of
Proposition 13 by SB 154.

(These additional amounts of

property tax revenue were available to allocate to cities,
counties and special districts because property tax funding
of schools was substantially reduced and replaced by state
General Fund financing of local school districts, with
minimum school revenue guarantees.)
The combination of these two amounts became the 1979-80

•

"base" amount of property tax revenues to which every local
agency was entitled.

In this way, the entire amount of the

new smaller pot of property tax revenues under Proposition
13 was allocated among local agencies.

Each year, local

agencies are guaranteed to receive this "base" amount of
revenue, plus growth (as described below).
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Increment.

The second part of the AB 8 system

determines how property tax revenues arising from growth
and development after 1978-79 are to be allocated to local
agencies.

These new revenues from growth are called

"increment."

Specifically, increment is growth in property

tax payments resulting from the following features of
Proposition 13's assessment system:

1) the annual two

percent increase in assessment, 2) the increases due to new
construction, and 3) the increases due to changes in
ownership.
AB 8 provides that ''increment" is to be distributed to
local agencies on a situs basis, that is, based on the
geographic location of the properties whose value had
grown.
Because this is a situs-based system, county assessors
and auditors must keep track of properties within very
small geographic cells.
(TRAs).

These are called Tax Rate Areas

A TRA is an area in which all parcels are served

by the exact same mix of local agencies.
Chart 1 below contains a simplified schematic example of
how a county would be divided into TRAs.

In the example in

Chart 1, TRA #1 is served by the County and City A; TRA #2
is served by the County, City A, and the Special District;
TRA #3 is served by the County and the Special District;
TRA #6 is served by the County only; and so on.
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Chart 1
EXAMPLE OF HOW A COUNTY IS DIVIDED INTO TAX RATE AREAS (TRAs)

•

COUNTY
UNINCORPORATED

TRA 1

CITY A

AREA

1

TRA
2

TRA 3
TRA

SPECIAL DIST

I

4

I

TRA 5
TRA 6

CITY B

AB 8 provides that when pro?erty values increase within

a particular TRA, only the local agencies serving that TRA
will receive the additional property tax revenues.

AB 8

also provides how the additional revenues are to be
allocated among those agencies: the increment is allocated

I
within TRAs by formula in proportion to each agency's
average share of property tax revenues in the TRA in the
three years preceding Proposition 13.

This is the same

formula approach as was used for allocation of the "base"
portion of the property tax.
Therefore, incremental revenues are allocated by a
two-step process, first to geographic areas based on the
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location of the growth, and then among the local agencies
which serve the area by formula based on historical share
of the property tax.
AB 8 Recap
In sum, then, AB 8 put into place a complex system of
allocating property tax revenues by formula.

The formula is a

hybrid which allocates revenues to local agencies each year
partially in relation to their pre-Proposition 13 local fiscal
position and partially in relation to the location and value
of growth since 1978-79.

The pre-Proposition 13 fiscal

position of a local agency affects its current share of
property tax revenues in both the "base'' and "increment"
portions of the AB 8 allocation system.

Unlike the

pre-Proposition 13 system, the AB 8 formulas can produce
shifting of revenues among local agencies within a county.
The Case of No-Property-Tax Cities
A category of local government agencies affected in a
rather extreme way by AB 8 is the so-called "no-property-tax
cities" (and their cousins, "low-property-tax cities'').

These

are cities which levied no city property tax (or a very low
tax rate, in the case of the "lows") prior to the enactment of
Proposition 13.
Because AB 8 formulas provide that allocations of property
tax revenues depend on pre-Proposition 13 levies,
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no-property-tax cities now receive no allocations of revenue
from the one percent rate.

Even though residents of tl1ese

cities pay the same one percent tax rate as residents of other
areas of the county, their city governments do not receive a
share of those tax payments.

A similar but less extreme

situation occurs with low-property-tax cities, which receive

•

small allocations of revenues.

This result wad consistent

with the original goals of AB 8, because AB 8 was designed to
share the post-Proposition 13 property tax revenues among
local governments which levied property taxes immediately
before Proposition 13.
In 1987 and 1988, the Legislature enacted legislation
which modified AB 8 by requiring counties to shift portions of
their property tax allocations to certain low- and
no-property-tax cities.

These shifts are to occur over a

7-year phase-in period, and are beginning to be made in
1989-90.

Current Court Challenges to The Allocation System

•

Three lawsuits have been filed to date challenging the
property tax allocation system enacted by AB 8.

Each case has

been filed by a local government agency, and the defendants
are either other local agencies or the state, or both.
Although individual taxpayers are named as plaintiffs in
one of these suits, these basically are disputes between local
government agencies over division of local revenues.
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The cases vary according to characteristics of the local
agencies filing the actions, and the legal arguments brought
to bear are somewhat different.

However, all three have the

common feature of challenging the'constitutional validity of
the way current law allocates property tax revenues from the
countywide one percent rate among cities, counties, special
districts, and school districts.
The cases are as follows:
1)

Countx of San Diego v. Controller of the State of
California
In this lawsuit, San Diego County alleges that AB
8 requires an unfairly large proportion of property
tax collections in San Diego County to be allocated
to schools.

This allows the state to provide a

relatively smaller subsidy to San Diego County
schools than it provides in other counties, San Diego
County argues, while denying the county government of
property tax revenues to which it is entitled.
2)

City of Rancho Mirage v. County of Riverside
The City of Rancho Mirage is a no-property-tax
city.

In this lawsuit, the city argues that because

the AB 8 allocation formula is based on the amount of
property taxes levied by a local agency prior to
Proposition 13, no-property-tax cities like Rancho
Mirage are unfairly penalized by being denied any
allocation of the property tax today, even though
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their citizens pay the same tax rate as citizens
living elsewhere in the county.

In addition, the

city argues that this feature of AB 8 denies the
city's citizens the opportunity to take advantage of
the tax relief provisions of Article XIIIB, the
appropriations limit.
3)

City of Rancho Cucamonga( et. al. v. Counties of San
Bernardino and Los Angeles, et. al.
This suit is filed by the Cities of Rancho
Cucamonga, Temple City, Compton, El Segundo, and
Carson against the Counties of Los Angeles and San
Bernardino and the Cities of Los Angeles and
Redlands.
The plaintiff cities in the case are either
no-property-tax or low-property-tax cities.

They are

members of the Contract Cities Association, which is
sponsoring this lawsuit.
Like the Rancho Mirage case, this lawsuit argues

•

that the AB 8 system unfairly shifts property taxes
away from historically "frugal" cities and benefits
historically "spendthrift" cities within any given
county.

This results in harm to taxpayers, the

plaintiffs argue, because their tax dollars are being
exported to finance services to citizens of other
communities.
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Status of the Lawsuits
All three cases are currently at the Superior Court level,
and none have been argued.

Some of the parties have suggested

consolidating the three cases into one.
Summary of Arguments to Overturn The Allocation System
The following is a simplified summary of the points made
by plaintiffs in the three cases, arguing that the AB 8 system
is invalid:
1)

AB 8 is unfair, because it allocates property tax proceeds
without regard for who paid them, allowing property tax
proceeds to cross jurisdictional lines within a county.

2)

It violates the "tax situs" requirements of the California
Constitution, because taxpayers are not getting the
benefit of services from their tax dollars.

In some

cases, citizens are "paying twice" for services, since the
city must levy other taxes or fees to replace property tax
revenue it is not receiving.
3)

AB 8 is discriminatory and violates the equal protection
clauses of the California and United States Constitutions
because:

(a) historically low-tax cities are hurt

vis-a-vis historically high-tax cities, and (b) cities
incorporated after Proposition 13 are allowed to share in
the property tax while low-tax cities existing before
Proposition 13 are not.
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4)

The "home rule" provisions of the California Constitution
are violated.

These give charter cities the right to

control their own municipal and fiscal affairs.

AB 8

violates this by preventing cities from levying their own
property tax rates.
5)

AB 8 violates the "uniformity" provision of the state
Constitution, which requires uniform taxation for owners

•

of like property.

This occurs because a higher

county-government tax rate is imputed to property owners
in cities where lower revenues are allocated to city
government.

This results in property owners in different

areas of the county paying different county-government tax
rates even though they receive the same county services.
6)

The results of the AB 8 system have harmed the plaintiff
cities' abilities to provide essential public services and
solve pressing municipal problems.

7)

Even if the provisions of AB 8 were initially justif

by

the emergency resulting from adoption of Proposition 13,
that emergency no longer exists and conditions have

I

changed markedly in the decade since that time.

By

contrast, the inequities wrought by AB 8 will get worse
over time.
8)

Cities which have had property tax revenues shifted away
from them are denied the opportunity to give tax relief to
their residents under Article XIIIB of the California
Constitution (the appropriations limit).
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the

the return to taxpayers of revenues
governmental agency's annual appropriations limit.
Summary of Arguments to Sustain Allocation System

•

It is difficult to provide a complete summary of arguments
defendants will use to defend the validity of AB 8, because
defendants' answers filed in the courts to date have primarily
denied the charges made by plaintiffs and set forth procedural
objections.
Some of the general responses made by defendants include:
sufficient facts have not been presented to constitute a cause
of action; the action is barred by statutes of limitation;
defendants were acting in accordance with state law in
implementing the allocation system; the complaints contain
defects and misjoinders of parties; and others.
Based on conversations with representatives of the
defendants, it is expected that some of the more specific
es they will make in defending the validity of AB 8
will include:
1)

AB 8 does not violate the "home rule'' provisions of the
Constitution.

When the California Supreme Court upheld

the constitutionality of Proposition 13 in the Amador
Valley case in 1979 (see Chapter 1), SB 154 had already
been enacted.

SB 154 formed the basis for AB 8.

The

Supreme Court took the SB 154 revenue allocation scheme
into account and did not invalidate it.
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2)

AB 8 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the
United States or California Constitutions.

In matters of

taxation, the courts allow the Legislature great leeway so
long as there' is a rational basis for differences in tax
burdens.

In the case of AS 8, the Legislature distributed

a drastically-reduced property tax "pie" among the local
government entities which had levied property taxes prior
to Proposition 13.

Further, under AS 8, revenue growth

from new development is distributed on a situs basis.
This is a rational basis for the current allocation

•

system.
3)

There are no violations of "tax situs" principles, because
property tax revenues produced from properties within a
county remain with that county.

AB 8 does not permit

transfer of property tax revenues across county
boundaries.

'rhe "tax situs" principles apply within

county boundaries, not within sub-county boundaries.
4)

While plaintiffs point out the transfers of property tax
revenues away from them, they fail to acknowledge that

'

reverse transfers also occur.

That is, plaintiffs benefit

from aspects of the AS 8 formulas which shift property tax
revenues from other cities to the plaintiff cities.
5)

Plaintiffs fail to take into account other complicated
features of local government financing which bear on the
fairness of the AB 8 allocation system.

Examples include:

(a) statutes which rermit some ci'.. Lc?s, but not others, to

-32-

CHAPTER 2

levy property taxes to pay for pension systems 1
different levels of property taxes
redevelopment agencies in different c

(b)

to
, and (c

fact that in some counties contract cities are not
general overhead costs for county services 1 which are
for from general county funds, contributed to by all
county taxpayers.
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